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Assessing the potential impact of lease accounting 
reform: a review of the empirical evidence 
 
 
Summary 
 
Accounting standard-setters have proposed that the right to use assets (including land and 
buildings) acquired under operating lease contracts should be recognised on the balance sheet of 
lessee companies. In recent years, several empirical research studies have investigated the 
potential impact of the proposed changes in accounting for leases. The current paper reviews this 
work and presents some new evidence, for a property audience. 
 
The paper summarises evidence that operating leases represent a major source of finance for 
many companies generally, and more specifically for companies in the retail sector. Recognition 
of operating leases on the lessee’s balance sheet would have a significant impact on performance 
measures, especially gearing. If markets are informationally ‘efficient’ such changes should have 
little impact. However, research evidence on efficiency with respect to lease accounting 
information is mixed. What’s more, company managers do not believe that the market is efficient 
so are likely to behave as if the markets are ‘inefficient’. Possible reactions include reduced use 
of leasing, shorter lease contract terms, more break clauses, or increased use of contingent rental 
agreements. It seems likely that lessors will be under pressure to bear greater risks. 
 
Keywords: leases, accounting, SSAP21, G4+1, gearing, off-balance sheet finance, retail 
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Assessing the potential impact of lease accounting 
reform: a review of the empirical evidence 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The rights to use assets (including land and buildings) acquired under operating lease contracts 
are not currently recognised on the balance sheet of UK companies; rather, aggregate information 
about such contracts is disclosed by way of a note to the financial statements. Since the 
implementation in 1984 of the current UK lease accounting standard SSAP21 (ASC, 1984), off-
balance sheet operating leases have grown considerably, at the expense of on-balance sheet 
finance leases; Figure 1 illustrates this growth. Two discussion papers by the G4+1 group of 
accounting standard-setters
1
 have addressed the issue of off-balance sheet leases and the more 
recent of these proposes that all leases should be recognised on the balance sheet.
2
 As already 
recognised by the Investment Property Forum, this is an important issue for those involved in the 
property sector as a large proportion of the value of leases currently classified as operating leases 
relate to land and buildings (Investment Property Forum, 1999). In recent years, several 
empirical research studies have investigated the potential impact of the proposed changes in 
accounting for leases. The aim of the current paper is to summarise and review this research and 
some new evidence, for a property audience. 
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
2. Accounting for leases: current and proposed 
 
SSAP 21 identifies two types of lease and requires a radically different accounting treatment for 
each. A lease that transfers to the lessee substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership is a 
finance lease and is treated as an ‘in substance’ purchase by the lessee and sale by the lessor. 
Accordingly, an asset is shown on the lessee’s balance sheet at the present value of the minimum 
lease payments and a corresponding liability is recognised. On the other hand, a lease which does 
not transfer substantially all the risks and rewards of ownership to the lessee is deemed to be an 
operating lease. Under an operating lease the full value of the leased item is treated as an asset of 
the lessor and the lessee simply recognises the rental payments as an expense, with limited 
additional footnote disclosure of future lease rental commitments. Internationally, other existing 
leasing standards such as International Accounting Standard 17, and Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard 13 in the US, are based on similar concepts to SSAP 21 in relation to 
distinguishing finance leases from operating leases. In most circumstances, commercial property 
rented by UK businesses will be classified as operating leases since the lessor retains, to a greater 
or lesser extent, the risks and rewards of ownership. Thus, most rented properties do not feature 
in the tenants’ balance sheets. 
 
In recent years, accounting has seen a shift in focus towards a balance sheet approach, in which 
assets and liabilities are defined and criteria are set out for their recognition and measurement. 
This focus represents a fundamental shift away from the traditional ‘matching’ of income with 
related expenditure in the profit and loss account, and means that the measure of periodic income 
becomes more of a residual in the accounting process. The definitions of assets and liabilities are 
key features of this approach and underpin the development of accounting standards. Assets are 
defined as ‘rights or other access to future economic benefits controlled by an entity as a result of 
past transactions or events’; liabilities are ‘obligations of an entity to transfer economic benefits 
as a result of past transactions or events’ (ASB, 1999b). In light of these definitions, most lease 
transactions, including those which SSAP21 would categorise as operating leases, are likely to 
give rise to an asset and liability for the lessee. However, until explicitly withdrawn by the 
standard-setters, SSAP21 continues to apply.  
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This change in accounting focus provides the background for the developments in accounting for 
leases. In 1996, the G4+1 published a special report entitled Accounting for Leases: A New 
Approach (McGregor, 1996). This identified several fundamental deficiencies in current lease 
accounting standards. First, they omit material assets and liabilities arising from ‘off-balance 
sheet’ operating lease contracts. Second, marginal differences in contractual terms can result in 
one lease being claimed as a finance lease and another as an operating lease and thus similar 
transactions do not receive the same accounting treatment. Third, the ‘all or nothing’ approach to 
the capitalisation of leased assets does not adequately reflect modern complex transactions. The 
report went on to explore a conceptual approach to lease accounting, recommending that new 
standards should be developed that would remove the distinction between finance leases and 
operating leases and would require lessees to recognise as assets and liabilities all material rights 
and obligations arising under lease contracts.  
 
More recently, the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) published a discussion paper Leases: 
Implementation of a New Approach (ASB, 1999a), in which the G4+1 develops the approach 
recommended in the special report. The discussion paper recommends that all leases should be 
reflected in financial statements in a consistent manner and it explores the principles that should 
determine the extent of the assets and liabilities that lessees and lessors would recognise under 
leases. In particular, it argues that conceptually the right to use an item of property for the lease 
term (rather than the physical item itself) is an asset of the lessee. Similarly the lessee’s 
obligation to make lease rental payments is a liability. Under the recommended approach, at the 
beginning of a lease the lessee would recognise an asset and a liability equivalent to the fair value 
of the rights and obligations that are conveyed by the lease (usually the present value of the 
minimum payments required by the lease). Thereafter, the accounting for the lease asset and 
liability would follow the normal requirements for accounting for fixed assets and debt. The 
lessor would report financial assets (representing amounts receivable from the lessee) and 
residual interests in the property as separate assets. 
 
Several features of commercial property leases create difficulties for accountants; in particular, 
break clauses, renewal options, contingent rentals and rent reviews. For example, if a lease 
contains a break clause, should the lessee’s liability be based on rentals up to the break point or 
to the end of the lease term? The general principle that the G4+1 discussion paper adopts is that 
the exercise of options (e.g. renewal or purchase options) should not usually be anticipated. 
Rather the option itself should be valued and recorded separately, if material. Thus, the 
discussion paper suggest that only payments up to the next break date should be included, since 
the payments beyond that data can be avoided by the lessee. However, in circumstances where 
the lessee effectively has to occupy or possess the property for the longer term, this will be 
deemed to be the minimum lease term. 
 
As far as contingent rentals (based on usage or turnover/profit) are concerned, the proposal is that 
only the base rental should be valued. The contingent element should not be anticipated unless 
the minimum lease payments are clearly unrepresentative of the value of property rights 
conveyed by the lease. The fair value of property rights, argues the discussion paper, can be 
estimated by comparison with a similar lease having no provision for contingent rentals. 
 
Most long-term property leases in the UK contain provision for regular ‘upward-only’ rent 
reviews. The G4+1 argues that, since the future rent increases cannot be avoided by the lessee, 
the increases should be estimated at the beginning of the lease contract and incorporated in the 
asset/liability value of the lease.
3
 However, the UK accounting standard-setting body dissents 
from this view because, it argues, it will often not be possible to make reliable estimates of the 
effect of such increases (ASB, 1999a, p. 4). The ASB prefers that only existing rentals should 
form the basis of the lease asset/liability and that adjustments should be made at the time of rent 
reviews. 
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Finally, the need to separately account for any service element in lease contracts, such as repairs, 
maintenance and insurance is confirmed in the discussion paper. Thus, as required under present 
lease accounting standards, the services element will not form part of the capitalised lease asset 
but will be charged as an expense by the lessee as incurred. However, this will impose a new 
requirement to split operating lease rentals for properties such as serviced offices between service 
and property components. The discussion paper does not go into any detail concerning how this 
split might be carried out, but two possible approaches can be envisaged. First, the information 
might be available from the lessor. Such information will be needed by the lessor to split out the 
property component of the rental to compute the two balance sheet elements for the property 
(future amounts receivable from the lessee and the residual interest) and to identify the service 
element to be recognised as profit annually. However, the landlord might be reluctant to disclose 
such commercially sensitive information to tenants. Alternatively, a comparison with lease 
rentals for office space without services could provide the basis for estimating the split into 
components. 
 
3. Impact of operating lease capitalisation on lessees’ financial 
statements 
 
Company financial statements will be affected in several ways by the proposed new accounting 
treatment of leases. Table 1 illustrates the changes for a simplified hypothetical lessee company 
that leases a retail outlet for a term of 5 years with lease rentals of £250k payable annually in 
arrears. The present value of the lease rentals is £1,000k (implicit interest rate of 7.93%). The 
first column of Panel A shows the balance sheet at 31 December 2000 assuming that the lease is 
treated as an operating lease; balance sheets for 2001 through 2005 would be identical. The 
remaining columns show balance sheets for each of the five years assuming that the lease is 
capitalised. The first column of Panel B shows the profit and loss account assuming operating 
lease treatment; the second column shows the incremental effect of capitalising the lease for the 
first year, and the remaining columns show the profit and loss accounts for each year assuming 
capitalisation. Three performance ratios are also calculated and given at the foot of the balance 
sheets and profit and loss accounts.  
 
< Table 1 about here> 
 
In the balance sheet at 31 December 2000, fixed assets will increase by the capitalised operating 
lease asset (£1,000k), and liabilities will also increase by the present value of the rental 
payments, split between the short-term portion due within one year (£171k) and the longer-term 
portion (£829k). Initially the net debt to equity gearing ratio will jump from 40% to 140%. 
Subsequent balance sheets will reflect the declining net book value of the fixed asset and the 
reduction in lease liability as ‘capital’ is repaid. Shareholders’ equity (retained profit) will be 
changed by the cumulative profit and loss effect of capitalisation. 
  
In the profit and loss account the full operating lease rental (OLR) payment of £250k is presently 
charged against operating profit as a tax-deductible expense. Under the proposals, depreciation 
on the operating leased asset will be charged against operating profit and the interest element of 
the OLR will be included under interest charges. Depreciation would be a constant £200k per 
annum, assuming straight-line depreciation, to write off the asset value over the life of the lease 
(presumed to be shorter than the useful life of the asset). Interest would be £79k in the year to 31 
December 2001, declining to £19k in year five. The impact is that, every year, EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation) will be higher by £250k as the OLR 
will not be charged against EBITDA. Operating profit will also increase by £50k (since 
depreciation < OLR) in each of the five years. 
 
Profit before tax will be lower in the early years of a lease, (depreciation + interest > OLR) and 
higher in the later years as the interest element of OLR declines (depreciation + interest < OLR). 
For example, in 2001, depreciation (£200k) plus interest (£79k) exceeds OLR (£250m) by £29k, 
so profit before tax will reduce by this amount. By contrast, in 2005, depreciation plus interest 
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has fallen to £219k and is lower than OLR, so profit before tax will actually increase by £31k. 
Under current tax rules, the amount of tax paid will be unchanged, so in this simplified example 
the changes in profit after tax (and retained profit) are identical to the changes in profit before 
tax.
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Over the five-year period the total profit after tax will be the same (£600k) and is independent of 
the accounting treatment of the lease; the issue is how profit should be allocated to the individual 
accounting periods. Similarly, there is no change in annual cash flow. However, the balance 
sheet does change significantly depending on the choice between recognition of the asset and 
liability on-balance sheet and disclosure of information (off-balance sheet). 
 
The impact on performance measures is clearly illustrated. The gearing measure (net debt/equity) 
initially increases fairly dramatically and then declines back to its original level by the end of 
2005. This reflects, perhaps more realistically, the level of financial risk that results from the 
company’s commitment to make future rental payments. Operating (and EBITDA) margins will 
maintain a higher level under lease capitalisation; in the example, the operating margin increases 
from 6.7% to 8.3%. The impact on return on capital employed (ROCE) varies according to the 
balance between the respective impacts on profit and on capital employed. In the illustration, 
ROCE decreases initially because the increase in capital employed dominates the increase in 
operating profit; however, from 2003 onwards, capital employed has reduced somewhat to give a 
net increase in ROCE.  
 
4. How important are operating leases? 
 
Several studies have investigated the importance of operating lease capitalisation. Imhoff, Lipe 
and Wright (1991) developed a method for the constructive capitalisation of operating leases and 
used this to estimate the impact of capitalisation on two ratios (return on assets and debt to 
equity) for 14 US companies (seven matched pairs, selected to represent high and low operating 
lease use). They found that capitalisation would give rise to material differences in the ratios for 
both ‘high’ and ‘low’ lessees. A subsequent paper explored income effects of operating lease 
capitalisation and found that the effects can be both substantial and unpredictable in direction 
(Imhoff, Lipe and Wright, 1997). The retail investment analyst team at Dresdner Kleinwort 
Benson produced a research report highlighting the high level of gearing that would result from 
capitalising operating leases (Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, 1998). This was based on a detailed 
study of 27 large UK general retail companies and showed that ‘net debt would be in excess of 
100% of equity market capitalisation in many cases, …. exposing shareholders to extremely 
volatile returns’. While these studies were based on small samples, two recent UK studies have 
used more representative samples. 
 
These two empirical studies used a similar approach, involving the ‘constructive capitalisation’ 
of operating lease assets and liabilities based on the footnote disclosure in companies’ financial 
statements. The estimated value of lease asset and liability is calculated as the present value of 
minimum lease payments. This requires an estimate of the average lease term, remaining lease 
life and an appropriate discount rate for each company. The first study (Beattie, Edwards and 
Goodacre, 1998) used a random sample of 232 non-financial UK companies based on data for 
the period 1990-94. The second (Goodacre, 2001) used 1994-99 data for all 102 companies in the 
UK retail sector, a sector identified as likely to be a heavy user of operating lease finance. A 
comparison between the long-term element of operating leases and long-term debt is presented in 
Figures 2 and 3.
5
 
 
<Figure 2 about here> 
 
For 1994, the mean operating lease liability across all sectors was estimated to be £51m, of 
which £8m was due within 1 year and £43m was long-term. This compared with on-balance 
sheet long-term debt of £108m. The broad services sector was identified as a major user of 
operating lease finance with a mean total liability of £127m. A clearer picture emerges by 
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calculating the ratio of operating lease to debt finance, as summarised in Figure 3. This 
demonstrates that, overall, operating leases represented 39% of on-balance sheet debt, but 54%, 
14% and 69% respectively for the consumer goods, general industrial and services sectors. 
 
<Figure 3 about here> 
 
In the retail sector overall for 1999, the mean operating lease liability was estimated to be 
£234m, of which £12m was due within 1 year and £222m was long-term. This compared with 
on-balance sheet long-term debt of £67m. The ratio of operating lease to debt finance was 332% 
overall, and 158% in food retailing and 512% in general retailing. Thus operating lease finance 
represents a major source of finance in the UK particularly for the services sector, and for retail 
companies within that sector. By contrast, finance leases were comparatively unimportant: 
operating lease liabilities were found to be 13 times (37 times) the level of finance lease 
liabilities across all sectors (retail companies).  
 
The related off-balance sheet operating lease assets were approximately 6% and 28% of the on-
balance sheet assets across all sectors and in the retail sector, respectively. Thus a significant 
proportion of UK companies’ assets do not appear on their balance sheets. ‘Land and buildings’ 
is, by far, the major asset category financed by operating leases, representing 80% by value 
across all sectors and 98% in the retail sector. Capitalisation of operating leases would also have 
a significant impact on reported profit levels. In the retail sector, operating profit would increase 
by 23%, on average; profit after tax would fall by approximately 7%.
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The observation that retail companies employ high levels of operating leases to finance (mainly) 
land and buildings assets is consistent with a priori expectations. Typically, the assets are fairly 
‘standard’ (i.e. not firm-specific) and so can be transferred to alternative use (or users) at the end 
of the lease. Further, the growth in ‘out-of-town’ shopping in the UK, coupled with restrictions 
on developments has led to demand for such sites generally exceeding supply. Thus, the lessors’ 
‘residual value’ risk (including the residual value of the asset, and the costs of disposal or re-
letting, at the end of the lease) can be relatively low, making such assets attractive to lessors. In 
turn, any benefits can be passed on, at least partially, to the lessees. More recently, perhaps, 
retailers have opted to ‘outsource’ property provision to enable management to focus on their 
core skill of retailing and also to release funds for expansion or brand investment. 
 
Companies’ performance is often measured using key ratios such as operating profit margin and 
return on capital employed; financial risk is assessed using interest cover and various measures 
of gearing. In some contexts performance is judged against an absolute benchmark. For example, 
loan covenant restrictions may focus on a maximum gearing level or a minimum level of interest 
cover (or both). Executive compensation schemes may, in part, be based on achieving a 
particular level of profitability (e.g. return on assets, or return on equity). In other decision 
contexts, such as investment decisions made by investors, the relative performance of companies 
may be more relevant (i.e. company rankings). The two studies investigated the impact that 
operating lease capitalisation would have on absolute performance measures by comparing the 
differences between pre- and post-capitalisation ratios. The impact on relative performance was 
assessed by measuring the correlation between pre- and post-capitalisation ratios. Results for 
three of the nine ratios investigated, operating profit margin, return on capital employed (ROCE) 
and net debt to equity gearing ratio, are summarised in Table 2. 
 
< Table 2 about here> 
 
For the earlier cross-sectoral study (Panel A), operating profit margin and gearing increased 
significantly in all three sectors and overall. For example, the mean operating profit margin 
increased from 8.8% to 9.8%, overall and from 8.1% to 10.1% in the services sector. Gearing 
increased from 20% to 72%, overall and from 24% to 141% in the services sector. The effect of 
operating lease capitalisation on ROCE was small and not statistically significant. Rank 
correlations for profit margin and ROCE were quite high overall, at 0.953 and 0.992 respectively 
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and only slightly lower in services. However, the correlation for gearing was lower overall 
(0.738) and much lower in services (0.534). Thus, capitalisation of operating leases would have a 
major impact on absolute performance ratio measures, and relative company ranking of financial 
risk (gearing) would change significantly. 
 
The high use of operating leases in the retail sector is reflected in the changes in performance 
ratios (Panel B). The changes in all three ratios are economically and statistically significant, 
with just one exception, the mean measure for ROCE in food retailing. For example, over all 
retailers, the mean operating margin increases from 6.6% to 10.0% and gearing increases 
dramatically from 12% to 285%. Intra-sector and sub-sector company rankings are also affected, 
with rank correlations of 0.871, 0.894 and 0.172 for operating margin, ROCE and gearing 
respectively. Thus, operating lease capitalisation in the retail sector would affect both absolute 
and relative performance measures, especially measures of financial risk. 
 
A major assumption in the above estimates, somewhat unrealistic in the light of prior evidence, is 
that company management will not take any steps to mitigate the effect of capitalisation. Rather 
extremely, they might change their asset financing policies away from leasing, but this may not 
be possible, for example in obtaining access to ‘land and buildings’ assets. Alternatively, they 
might seek to modify lease contract terms to minimise the impact of capitalisation as illustrated 
by their switch from finance to operating lease contracts in response to the introduction of 
SSAP21 (Figure 1). Based on the current G4+1 proposals, a possible route focuses on the 
treatment of break clauses or renewable leases. A lease contract could include a break clause or 
could be written for a fairly short primary rental period with an option to renew the lease. Under 
the G4+1 proposals, the exercise of renewal options ‘should not generally be anticipated’ except 
where the fixed non-cancellable term is clearly unrepresentative of the period that the lessee is 
compelled to use the property (ASB, 1999a, pp. 90-91). Thus, one way to mitigate the impact of 
lease capitalisation would be to use break clauses, or shorter primary lease periods (much shorter 
than current practice on ‘land and buildings’ contracts) with options to renew for further short 
periods.  
 
Goodacre (2001) reports estimates based on the fairly radical assumptions that all lease contracts 
(i.e., both ‘other’ and ‘land and buildings’ categories) could be negotiated to have a maximum 
term of 5 years, and that the value of the renewal option/break clause will be small and so can be 
ignored.
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 Even under these assumptions, operating lease assets and liabilities would remain a 
substantial feature on retail companies’ balance sheets. The mean total operating lease liability 
estimates are £94m (food retailers), £77m (general retailers) and £80m (all); the long-term 
element of these liabilities represents 37%, 128% and 82% of on-balance sheet debt, 
respectively. Overall, reported operating lease assets would represent approximately 11% of total 
assets. The impact on profit would also be slightly reduced but, across the retail sector overall, 
operating profit would still increase by about 9% and profit after tax would decrease by about 
4%; the impact on general retailers would continue to be slightly greater than on food retailers. 
 
These reductions in operating lease assets and liabilities reduce the impact on performance ratios, 
but the pattern and (statistical) significance of the changes are almost identical to the results 
based on current lease terms. Correlations between pre- and post-capitalisation ratios, for the 
retail sector as a whole, are 0.976, 0.987 and 0.495 for operating margin, ROCE and gearing 
respectively. While these are higher than those reported in Table 2, the low correlation for 
gearing implies major changes in the ranking of companies’ financial risk characteristics. The 
situation of maximum 5-year lease contracts modelled is obviously quite extreme and may not be 
realistic for many contracts. However, other ‘opportunities’ for mitigating the impact may be 
available (e.g. the use of contingent rental contracts?). The results suggest that, in the retail 
sector, lease capitalisation will probably have a fairly major impact on published financial 
statements and on performance ratios, even if company managers take steps to minimise the 
impact. 
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Overall, there is considerable evidence that operating leases are important and that their 
capitalisation on balance-sheet is likely to affect both absolute measures of performance ratios 
and the relative ranking of companies.   
 
5. Does it really matter? 
 
Does it really matter whether leases are recognised as assets and liabilities on a company’s 
balance sheet? Finance leases are already on the balance sheet, and some details of operating 
leases are disclosed by way of a footnote to the balance sheet, so users already have a reasonable 
amount of lease information. It does matter if the changes brought about by capitalisation of 
operating leases change the behaviour of any of the interested parties. For example, will investors 
behave differently if the leases are on the balance sheet and the profit and loss account changes 
as described above? Might bank, or other, lenders be willing to lend less money to the company 
or change the terms of loans (e.g. interest rate, loan covenant restrictions, loan term)? Might 
company managers change the way they operate by buying, or constructing, the asset instead of 
leasing, or might they try to re-negotiate the terms of lease contracts (e.g. lease period, contingent 
elements, break clauses, renewal options etc)? Might they change the mix of debt and equity in 
the capital structure? 
 
For external users of financial statements, lease capitalisation has the potential to convey new, 
valuable, information about the risks and/or rewards of their relationship with the company. 
However, this can only happen if the information is not already available to the users, or if they 
can more fully appreciate the meaning of the information in its newly recognised form. If users 
are ‘efficient’ information processors (as assumed in the so-called efficient markets hypothesis) 
then the capitalisation of operating leases is unlikely to convey any significant new information. 
Users will already appreciate the meaning and significance of operating leases from the footnotes 
and/or other information sources. So, what is the evidence on users’ informational efficiency? 
 
The evidence on users’ processing of lease accounting information is somewhat conflicting. For 
example, an experimental approach was used by Abdel-khalik (1981) to explore the alternative 
accounting methods for leases (capitalisation versus footnote-only disclosure) using a range of 
interested participants. He found that external users (equity and bond investment analysts, and 
bank loan officers) expressed a preference for a company that reported the leases in a footnote 
over an identical company that capitalised leases on-balance sheet. Wilkins and Zimmer (1983a) 
and Wilkins (1984) used Singapore-based bank loan officers as subjects in a similar experiment 
and found that the subjects’ decisions were affected by levels of leverage but not by the method 
of accounting. In a related study, the behaviour of investment analysts was affected by the 
method of accounting (Wilkins and Zimmer, 1983b). Similarly, Munter and Ratcliffe (1983) 
found that investment managers’ decisions were affected by lease accounting methods. 
Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1996) used a survey method to identify that both lenders and 
managers/preparers are more likely to consider recognised (on-balance sheet) lease obligations as 
equivalent to debt than disclosed (off-balance sheet) obligations. They also noted that lenders are 
more likely than managers/preparers to regard disclosed obligations as debt. Breton and Taffler 
(1995) conducted a laboratory experiment using UK investment analysts to investigate their 
response to nine forms of creative accounting, one of which was non-capitalised leases. In 
general, the analysts did not make adjustments when calculating familiar financial ratios. On 
balance, the evidence suggests that some individual users do appear to be influenced by whether 
the information is recognised in the financial statements or merely disclosed in the footnotes to 
the accounts. 
 
On the other hand, there is both general and lease-specific evidence that users in aggregate (i.e., 
the stock market) are not misled by such presentational issues. In particular, there is quite strong 
evidence for both the UK (Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2000b) and the US (Ely, 1995; Imhoff, 
Lipe and Wright, 1993) that the market already incorporates footnote operating lease disclosures in 
its assessment of equity risk.
8
 However, the research design adopted in these studies is unable to 
determine whether or not the extent of the market’s adjustment to equity risk is ‘correct’. Further, 
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there is evidence that, at least some, investment analysts and credit rating agencies recast financial 
statements by calculating the assets and liabilities implicit in off-balance sheet operating leases 
(e.g., Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, 1998). 
 
The general evidence that markets are informationally efficient suggests that any changes in 
reported performance resulting from the accounting changes are probably already impounded in 
stock market prices. However, the evidence that individual users (e.g., bank-lenders, investment 
analysts) may not be informationally efficient suggests that company capital-raising may be 
affected by the proposed accounting changes. Further, there is strong evidence that company 
managers do not believe that users, in aggregate or individually, process information efficiently 
(e.g. Mayer-Sommer, 1979; Abdel-khalik, 1981; Taylor and Turley, 1985). This suggests that 
managers’ decisions will be affected by the expected change in performance measures if all 
leases are required to be recognised on lessees’ balance sheets, as a result of information 
inductance (Prakash and Rappaport, 1977). That is, company managers expect users to respond 
differently to the new reporting methods so the managers are likely to behave as if the markets 
are ‘inefficient’.9 
 
6. Leasing and capital structure 
 
Survey results suggest that managers believe that overall ‘debt capacity’ can be increased by 
using leases; (UK: Drury and Braund, 1990; US: Bathala and Mukherjee, 1995; Gopalakrishnan 
and Parkash, 1996). Further, regression-based analyses confirm that companies behave as if lease 
finance is complementary to (US: Ang and Peterson, 1984), or only a partial substitute for debt 
finance (US: Marston and Harris, 1988; Krishnan and Moyer, 1994; UK: Adedeji and Stapleton, 
1996; Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson, 2000a; Belgium: Deloof and Verschueren, 1999); in both 
situations the use of leases allows an increase in overall ‘borrowing’. In the UK, Adedeji and 
Stapleton (1996) estimated that £1 of finance leasing displaced about £0.55 of debt. Most studies 
have investigated only finance leases, but Beattie, Goodacre and Thomson (2000a) found that £1 
of leases (mainly operating leases) displaced approximately £0.23 of debt for UK companies. 
Thus, operating leases appear to absorb less debt capacity than finance leases, consistent with the 
argument that lessors bear risks, particularly in operating lease contracts, that would be borne by 
the lessee company if debt finance were used. 
 
The inclusion of operating leases on companies’ balance sheets has the potential to change 
lenders and/or company managers’ perception of ‘debt capacity’. In turn, this might affect 
companies’ overall capital structure policies. The requirement to capitalise finance leases 
following the introduction of the original lease accounting standards seems to have had such an 
impact. Evidence of changes in capital structure was found in the US (Abdel-khalik, 1981) and in 
Australia (Godfrey and Warren, 1995). Also for the US, Imhoff and Thomas (1988) document a 
systematic substitution from finance leases to operating leases and non-lease sources of finance; 
this suggests that re-negotiation of lease contracts may be a relatively low-cost alternative for 
mitigating the financial statement effects. In addition, lessees appeared to reduce book leverage 
by increasing equity and reducing conventional debt. In the UK, Garrod (1989) found that 
managers reacted to the standard by reducing their non-lease debt prior to their first disclosure of 
lease information following the introduction of SSAP21. 
 
 
7. Implications 
 
If, in future, all leases are treated similarly (i.e., are included on the lessee’s balance sheet) this 
might change company managers attitudes to leasing. First, company managers might reduce 
their use of leasing (for example, because of concerns about users’ perception of the company’s 
closeness to its ‘borrowing capacity’). This might encourage greater involvement in the 
construction and ownership of property. In this approach the company owner benefits from rising 
property values, but also takes on the risk of falls in value. If an interest-only loan is used to fund 
the purchase, gearing will remain high until the loan is repaid, though a ‘repayment’ mortgage 
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would more closely mirror the gearing under a lease contract. However, the cost of the freehold 
is likely to be higher than the present value of lease rentals so gearing will be higher. Also 
increased owner-occupation runs counter to the trend towards outsourcing all but core activities. 
Further, the option is not always available since the relevant properties or sites may already be 
under long-term ownership by property companies or financial institutions.  
 
Second, managers might prefer to continue with the leasing alternative while seeking lease 
contract terms that minimise the balance sheet impact of lease capitalisation. This could take 
various forms including increased use of break clause, or renewable shorter-term leases or 
perhaps the greater use of contingent rental agreements. 
 
Ringer and Unerman (2000) discuss the short-term implications of this change in management 
attitude to leasing. They suggest that tenants whose leases expire are likely to negotiate new 
leases with greater flexibility and shorter terms. This may result in increased market rents to 
compensate landlords for the reduction in the security that long-term leases currently offer. The 
impact of such changes on lessee and lessor will depend on their relative bargaining positions. In 
prime sites where there is a shortage in supply, landlords will be in a strong position to demand 
higher rents for shorter leases. In sectors or regions where supply exceeds demand, changes in 
market rents are unlikely to fully reflect the increased risk suffered by the landlord. The authors 
also suggest that the sale and leaseback market will change with prospective landlords probably 
needing to offer more flexible leaseback terms, including regular tenant break options. The 
current occupiers will often have to accept either a lower sale value or higher rents to compensate 
the landlord. Also, forthcoming break clauses may be used by tenants to renegotiate lease 
conditions in areas where there is excess supply of property. 
 
Obviously, the use of effectively shorter lease terms would not suit all circumstances. However, 
it is consistent with the trend towards lessees seeking shorter leases for purely commercial 
reasons, mainly reflecting lessees’ need for greater flexibility in choosing and changing locations 
of retail outlets, for example (Nelson, 1999; BPF/IPD, 1999; Crosby, Gibson and Murdoch, 
2000; Crosby, Gibson and Oughton, 2001). These renewable short contracts are likely to shift 
risks from lessees to lessors since, for example, the lessor will now bear the risk that the lessee 
will not exercise the option to renew (or will exercise a break option). This is most likely to 
happen when the attractiveness of the asset has reduced for some reason. When this is a general 
‘decline’ in the future worth of the asset, rather than lessee-specific, then a significant cost (loss 
of value, difficulty in obtaining a new lessee or disposing of the asset) will be borne by the 
lessor. Thus, the major implication of the changes in company management behaviour is that 
lessors are likely to be under pressure to bear greater risks than previously. 
 
Finally, what are the implications for the future of real estate leasing? Does the increased risk 
mean that investors/lessors will be less enthusiastic to invest in property? This seems unlikely, 
though investors in future will perhaps need a greater focus on risk management. Prior research 
provides evidence of plausible and rational links between returns and risk, suggesting that in the 
longer-term, the increased risk is likely to be compensated by increased return. Also, while 
increased residual value risk and transaction costs are likely to increase required yields, shorter 
lease contracts have the countervailing benefit of reducing default risk.
10
 Overall, it seems likely 
that the rationales for the existence of commercial real estate leasing (see, for example, 
Benjamin, de la Torre and Musumeci, 1998) will continue, even expand; market imperfections 
are likely to allow both landlord and tenants to continue to benefit from leasing. 
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Endnotes
                                                     
1
 Until its dissolution in 2001, the G4+1 consisted of members from the accounting standard-setting bodies 
of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, the US and the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC). The group represented an informal attempt to co-operate over developments so as to 
ensure similar accounting standards in each jurisdiction. This role has now been subsumed by the newly-
constituted International Accounting Standards Board. 
 
2
 Since December 1999, all the G4+1 organisations have published the discussion paper in their own 
jurisdictions but further progress on accounting standards is likely to be slow. The next stage in the 
procedure would be to issue a Financial Reporting Exposure Draft (FRED) containing detailed proposals 
for comments. This would be followed, perhaps a year or so later, by an accounting standard. However, 
even in the UK where there has been strong commitment to the project, the ASB on its web-site (August 
2002) reports that it ‘is considering the issues raised by respondents to the (Discussion) Paper, and is 
continuing to exchange views and information with other members of the G4+1. Due to the complexity of 
the issues involved, it is expected to take some time to fully consider them. Therefore, it is unlikely that a 
Financial Reporting Exposure Draft will be published in the near future.’ Recent developments in attempts 
to harmonise accounting standards internationally have also slowed down the process. The difficulties in 
achieving consensus on changes in lease accounting mean that it is not a politically attractive topic for 
early consideration by an International Accounting Standards Board seeking globally-acceptable 
accounting standards. However, the difficulties are likely to cause delay rather than abandonment; the issue 
will not go away as the standard setters fully recognise the need for change. Indeed the lease accounting 
standard in the US was voted the ‘worst accounting standard’ by a group of leading accountants (Reither, 
1998). 
 
3
 This treatment is theoretically sound since a nominal interest rate (which incorporates the market’s 
inflation expectations) is used to discount the minimum lease rentals. 
 
4
 In reality, the tax charged in the profit and loss account will be lower in the early years of the lease, 
reflecting the lower reported profit before tax, and higher in the later years. The difference between tax 
paid and charged is accommodated by adjustments to deferred tax. Further, the Inland Revenue is 
increasingly arguing that profit for tax purposes should generally follow accounting rules. Thus, it is 
entirely possible that the tax treatment of ‘operating’ lease rentals may change should the G4+1 proposals 
be adopted. 
 
5
 Comparisons between the two studies should be undertaken with caution in view of the different time 
periods, and the different assumptions concerning discount rates: 10% in Beattie Edwards and Goodacre 
(1998) compared with 8.5% in Goodacre (2001). 
 
6
 Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre (1998) did not separately report the impact on profit. 
 
7
 For simplicity, any increase in lease rental required to compensate for the lessor taking on additional 
residual value risk is also ignored. Thus, lessees’ operating lease assets and liabilities are likely to be 
understated. 
 
8
 By contrast, Gallery and Imhoff (1998) found no evidence that Australian stock market investors 
incorporate footnote operating lease disclosures in their assessment of equity risk.  
 
9
 For example, company managers appear to have reacted in this way to a requirement to report inflation-
adjusted income numbers in the US (Odaiyappa and Nainar, 1992). 
 
10
 Schallheim, Johnson, Lease and McConnell (1987) empirically examine the determinants of lease yields 
for a sample of (non-real estate) lease contracts. They confirm that lease yields are related to risk-free bond 
yields, and proxies for residual value risk, transaction and information costs associated with the lease, as 
well as lessee default risk. With shorter, renewable (or break) real estate lease contracts, residual value risk 
will increase and transaction costs are likely to represent a relatively larger part of total costs. If the broad 
thrust of Schallheim et al’s results were to apply to real estate, this suggests an increase in yields. 
Grenadier (1996) models credit spread on leases subject to default risk and identifies that the term structure 
of spreads is upward-sloping; i.e. the premium that a tenant must pay relative to a ‘riskless tenant’ will be 
less for shorter leases.  
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Figure 1: The growing use of operating leases by quoted companies 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Goodacre and Beattie (1999) 
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Figure 2: Operating leases and debt levels 
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Figure 3: Long-term operating leases as a percentage of long-term debt 
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Table 1: Illustration of the financial statement impact of lease capitalisation 
 
Base assumptions 
At 31 December 2000, a company has short-term assets of £1,400k and long-term debt of £400k (interest payable 
of £30k pa), giving equity shareholders funds of £1,000k. For simplicity, assume that sales (£3,000k pa) and profit 
before property costs (£450k pa) are constant over the five-year period, that all after-tax profits (£120k) are paid 
out as dividends, and that deferred taxation can be ignored. 
 
On 31 December 2000 the company leases a retail outlet for a term of 5 years with lease rentals of £250k payable 
annually in arrears. The present value of the lease rentals is £1,000k (implicit interest rate of 7.93%). 
 
 
  
Note: Return on capital employed is defined as EBIT/(Total assets less current liabilities) 
PANEL A Operating
lease
Balance Sheet as at 31 December 2000 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Assets
Leased property: net book value 0 1000 800 600 400 200 0
Other (short-term) assets 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400
Total assets 1400 2400 2200 2000 1800 1600 1400
Liabilities
Debt: long-term 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
Lease liability: short-term 0 171 184 199 215 231 0
Lease liability: long-term 0 829 645 446 231 0 0
Lease liability: total 0 1000 829 645 446 231 0
Total liabilities 400 1400 1229 1045 846 631 400
Total net assets 1000 1000 971 955 954 969 1000
Shareholders funds
Share capital 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Retained profit 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
Lease impact on profit (cumulative) 0 0 -29 -45 -46 -31 0
1000 1000 971 955 954 969 1000
Net debt/equity ratio (%) 40 140 127 109 89 65 40
PANEL B Impact
Profit and loss for year to 31 Dec 2001 in 2001 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Profit before property costs 450 0 450 450 450 450 450
Operating lease rental (OLR) -250 250 0 0 0 0 0
EBITDA 200 250 450 450 450 450 450
Depreciation 0 -200 -200 -200 -200 -200 -200
Operating profit (EBIT) 200 50 250 250 250 250 250
Interest -30 0 -30 -30 -30 -30 -30
Interest element of lease rental 0 -79 -79 -66 -51 -35 -19
Profit before tax 170 -29 141 154 169 185 201
Tax paid -50 0 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50
Profit after tax 120 -29 91 104 119 135 151
Dividends 120 0 120 120 120 120 120
Retained profit 0 -29 -29 -16 -1 15 31
Operating margin (%) 6.7 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3 8.3
Return on capital employed (%) 14.3 12.4 13.9 15.8 18.3 17.9
Capitalised lease
(all figures are £000s)
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Table 2: Changes in ratios following operating lease capitalisation 
Notes 
1. Median figures were sourced from Edwards (1997) 
2. Spearman rank correlation between pre- and post-capitalisation ratios 
3. Mean ratios reported here for the first time 
4. ** (*) = significance at 1% (5%) level of two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test of difference in medians, or 
two-tailed t-test of difference between means. 
 
 
Panel A: Random sample of 232 UK companies in 1994 (Beattie, Edwards and Goodacre, 1998)
 1
pre post pre post pre post pre post
Operating Mean 10.0 10.7 ** 7.1 7.7 ** 8.1 10.1 ** 8.8 9.8 **
margin (%) Median 9.2 9.8 ** 7.7 8.5 ** 6.7 9.5 ** 8.0 9.0 **
Correlation 
2
0.988 0.985 0.903 0.953
Return on capital Mean 10.5 11.1 14.8 14.7 16.2 15.9 14.6 14.5
employed (%) Median 13.9 14.2 15.5 15.6 17.0 16.2 15.6 15.6
Correlation 
2
0.999 0.997 0.982 0.992
Gearing (net debt Mean 22.0 45.0 ** 14.0 32.0 ** 24.0 141.0 ** 20.0 72.0 **
 to equity) (%) Median 12.0 29.0 ** 15.0 29.0 ** 19.0 56.0 ** 14.0 38.0 **
Correlation 
2
0.837 0.927 0.534 0.738
Panel B: All UK retail companies in 1999 (Goodacre, 2001)
pre post pre post pre post
Operating Mean 
3
1.5 4.2 ** 7.7 11.3 ** 6.6 10.0 **
margin (%) Median 4.3 5.7 ** 8.1 11.5 ** 7.7 10.7 **
Correlation 
2
0.816 0.864 0.871
Return on capital Mean 
3
14.2 12.8 24.7 15.9 ** 22.8 15.3 **
employed (%) Median 17.3 14.7 * 21.1 15.2 ** 18.9 15.2 **
Correlation 
2
0.827 0.901 0.894
Gearing (net debt Mean 
3
18.3 149.0 ** 10.6 320.6 ** 12.2 285.4 **
 to equity) (%) Median 15.2 111.3 ** 16.6 156.7 ** 15.9 153.6 **
Correlation 
2
0.294 0.151 0.172
Food retailers General retailers    All retailers  
Consumer Goods General Industrial        Services         All sectors   
